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ABSTRACT
The Belt and Road initiative, recently embarked on by China, aims to 
improve cross-border infrastructure in order to reduce transportation 
costs across a massive geographical area between China and Europe. 
We estimate how much trade might be created among Belt and Road 
countries as a consequence of the reduction in transportation costs 
(both railway and maritime) and find that European Union countries, 
especially landlocked countries, should benefit considerably. This is 
also true for eastern Europe and Central Asia and, to a lesser extent, 
south-east Asia. In contrast, if China were to seek to establish a free 
trade area within the Belt and Road region, EU member states would 
benefit less, while Asia would benefit more. Xi Jinping’s current vision 
for the Belt and Road, centred on improving transport infrastructure, 
is very good news for Europe as far as trade creation is concerned.
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1. Introduction 
 
The Belt and Road project is undoubtedly the most important international project that China has 
embarked on in the last few decades. It aims to stimulate economic development over a vast area 
covering sub-regions in Asia, Europe and Africa. Although there has been no official announcement 
about what countries are covered by the Belt and Road initiative, some official sources point to the 
involvement of at least 63 countries, including 18 European countries1. Particularly relevant for Europe 
is that the Road ends where the European Union (EU) starts. Most importantly, this massive bloc 
between the EU and China accounts for 64 percent of the world’s population and 30 percent of global 
GDP. 
 
One of the Belt and Road’s key objectives is to ease bottlenecks for cross-border trade, in particular 
through transport infrastructure. This should reduce the cost of transportation, thus stimulating trade 
between China and these countries. The same effect should be expected for the other end of the road – 
the EU – because cheaper transportation should also foster its trade with other Belt and Road 
countries, as well as with China. This paper measures empirically whether the reduction in 
transportation costs – shipping or railway costs – will have a positive impact on trade flows for Belt 
and Road countries and, most importantly, for EU countries. 
 
In addition to estimating the size of the trade gains stemming from a reduction in transportation costs, 
we explore the possibility that the Belt and Road may eventually go beyond its current objectives 
towards the creation of a free trade area. To that end, we establish a scenario in which China embarks 
on a free trade agreement (FTA) with the 63 countries of the Belt and Road initiative. This exercise is 
particularly relevant at the current juncture because the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a free trade 
agreement between a number of Pacific economies and the US, is about to be created2. China has so 
far been excluded from the TPP. In other words, we aim to identify empirically what kind of trade gains 
countries could expect from a reduction of transportation costs and to compare them with potential 
trade gains from reductions in tariffs stemming from a potential FTA. While our analysis estimates 
gains/losses for a large number of countries, our focus is EU member states. Our results indicate that 
the reduction in transportation costs from the Belt and Road initiative should benefit the vast majority 
of EU countries, especially landlocked countries. In comparison, if China reached a deal for the 
establishment of an FTA with the countries of the Belt and Road initiative, the benefits would be 
concentrated among Asian and non-western European countries. EU countries’ trade, in turn, would be 
harmed although in a relatively limited way. The reason for this is substitution of EU trade with 
countries within the Belt and Road as their intra-regional trade tariffs are dismantled. In a nutshell, this 
paper points to the benefits for the EU of Xi Jinping’s current vision for the Belt and Road initiative, 
which focuses on improving transport infrastructure rather than on a establishing a free trade area 
within the Belt and Road region. 
 
2. Trade as a key pillar of the Belt and Road initiative 
 
The Belt and Road’s key pillars to improve regional and international connectivity are infrastructure 
upgrade and trade facilitation. There are two major projects: one focuses on land connectivity and the 
other on sea routes. More specifically, the Silk Road Economic Belt comprises six economic corridors 
                                                          
1 Different sources vary in their definitions of Belt and Road countries. We choose a conservative definition of 63 countries, the number of countries invited 
by the Belt and Road Forum held by the General Administration of Customs of China in 2015. However, there are other sources indicating more extensive 
coverage. For example, the Industrialization of the Belt and Road Countries Report published by the China Academy of Social Science includes 65 coun-
tries. 
2 It should be noted that the 2016 US election campaign is raising doubts about whether TPP will finally be ratified by the US Congress. Both the Republi-
can and Democrat candidates have expressed dissatisfaction with the deal. 
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with a focus on transportation infrastructure and energy. Two of these corridors end in the EU and a 
third finishes in Europe, although not in the EU (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1: Roadmap for the Belt and Road initiative 
 
 
Source: HKTDC Research, http://china-trade-research.hktdc.com/business-news/article/One-Belt-One-Road/The-Belt-and-
Road-Initiative/obor/en/1/1X000000/1X0A36B7.htm 
 
There has been much speculation on the underlying reasons for China to engage in such a massive 
project (Garcia-Herrero, 2015). One of the main reasons put forward is China’s massive overcapacity 
(Djankov et al, 2016). While some of the overcapacity sectors are not necessarily obvious export 
sectors, cement being the best example, some offer the potential for greater exports. The best case – 
given its sensitivities in Europe3 – may be steel, in which China has rapidly been increasing its global 
market share (Figure 2). Overall, given the very negative impact of China’s overcapacity on its 
economy – as clearly indicated by the strongly negative producer prices – the Belt and Road appears 
to be a huge opportunity for Chinese exporters, given the huge economic and population size of the 
Belt and Road area. Given that the EU is at the other end of the Belt and Road, the question is whether 
European exporters will also benefit from such initiative. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
3 The European Commission said in July 2016 that it will increase import tariffs on China’s steel exports for anti-dumping reasons. 
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Figure 2: China’s steel production utilisation rate and global export market share (%) 
 
Source: Bruegel based on China Iron and Steel Association, UNCTAD, Bloomberg, Natixis. 
 
A very important point to take into account when assessing the impact of transportation costs on trade 
is how much a transportation mode whether maritime, road or railway, is used relative to others. In 
Figures 3 and 4, we find that China’s trade transportation is dominated by the maritime mode while the 
EU is dominated by land transportation4. 
 
 
Figure 3: Share of Chinese trade by 
transportation mode 
Figure 4: Share of EU’s trade  
by transportation mode 
 
 
Source: China Customs data. Source: Eurostat transport database, 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/transport/data/database. Note: 
We calculate the freight share of goods for each transportation 
mode. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
4 Note that the share is calculated by trade value for China but by freight weight for the EU. Calculating share by freight weight might to some extent under-
estimate the share of air transportation because higher weight goods are less likely to be transported by air. However, even so the comparison between 
maritime and land transportation might not be totally warranted as land transportation is still dominant for EU-China trade. 
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3. Our approach to measuring the impact of the Belt and Road Initiative on trade 
 
While the Belt and Road is a massive project with a number of implications, we focus on one of the key 
trade issues, namely the expected improvement in transport infrastructure. We ask whether and by 
how much the improvement will increase trade, and for which countries. We use a gravity model to 
assess empirically what the impact of a reduction in transportation costs might be on bilateral trade for 
all of the countries for which we can find relevant transport data. 
 
Methodology 
 
We choose the model specification proposed by Baier and Bergstrand (2009) because it has a rigorous 
theoretical background and can quantify not only the effect of a reduction in transportation time and/or 
cost on bilateral trade, but also the spillover effect (also called the ‘multilateral resistance effect’) on 
third countries (Anderson and Wincoop, 2003). The benefit of this method is that it takes into account 
the reaction of third countries to changes in the determinants of bilateral trade between two countries, 
while still avoiding the complexity of a more structural specification. The estimation equation is 
specified as follows: 
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Where Tradeij, refers to export values from country i to country j, Tariff‘sij, RailC’ij, AirC‘ij, OceanC’ij are 
bilateral tariffs, railway transportation costs, air costs and maritime costs that have been adjusted for 
the multilateral resistance factors5. Furthermore, Yi is the GDP of the exporting county and Xi is the GDP 
of the importing country. Other control variables are contiguity between two countries (ie those with 
shared borders), common currency, common language and post-colonial relationships6. 
 
Data description 
 
One of our key challenges was how to measure transportation costs between two countries and, even 
more so, which assumptions to make in terms of the future reduction of such transportation costs 
because of the improvement in infrastructure resulting from the Belt and Road initiative. 
 
For the measurement of transportation costs, we focus on sea, road, railway and air distance between 
any two capitals. We use several different databases, namely SEARATES for sea transportation and 
ROME2RIO and Google Maps for railways and roads. Regarding our objective variable, i.e. bilateral trade, 
we use databases from UN Comtrade (1999) and CEPII for our bilateral trade pairs. Based on data 
availability, we ended up with a sample of 16,748 country-pairs for 137 countries in the year 20137, 
including all 28 EU countries, 56 Belt and Road initiative countries, and a number of major economies 
outside Eurasia. Appendix I provides more detailed analysis of the sample coverage and summary 
statistical analysis. 
                                                          
5 See equation (A4) in the appendix. 
6 A discerning reader might find that we do not add multilateral resistance terms for our control variables. We do this only to simplify our analysis. We 
believe this assumption is plausible. As we show (see also Head and Mayer, 2014), multilateral resistance terms only generate marginal impact compared 
to the main direct effect, and the coefficients are stable with or without control variables. As such, ignoring these effects is expected to generate only very 
minor impacts on our main coefficients. 
7 As a standard technique in the gravity model literature, we also include the country pairs for internal trade, ie a country’s trade with itself, such as sales 
from China to China. 
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How sensitive is trade to transportation costs 
 
Our results show that a reduction in transportation costs has a statistically significant and positive 
impact on international trade. We report the best of our results (details of four different estimations can 
be found in the Appendices), namely those that take into account third-country effects (i.e., including 
the multilateral resistance term in Equation 1) as well as all control variables. We find that a 10 percent 
reduction in railway, air and maritime costs increases trade by 2 percent, 5.5 percent and 1.1 percent 
respectively. In other words, transportation costs are found to be statistically and economically 
significant in fostering international trade. 
 
Next, we move to comparing the impact of a reduction in transportation costs to a reduction in tariffs 
for international trade. This is a very relevant since we could think of the Belt and Road initiative as a 
sort of substitute free trade agreement as long as reductions in transportation costs are as effective in 
fostering trade as is dismantling tariffs. It is an important issue for China which has long feared being 
excluded from the largest – and most relevant – trade deal in the Pacific, ie the TPP. The reduction of 
transportation costs in an area as vast as the Belt and Road area should help reduce China’s worries 
about TPP as long the infrastructure that is being built does create new trade opportunities. 
 
Our empirical paper confirms this a priori. More specifically, a reduction in air and railway costs 
increases by trade more than a reduction in ad valorem tariffs (larger marginal impact). More 
specifically, a 10 percent reduction in transportation costs fosters trade by 1.3 percent while a 
reduction in tariffs has a much smaller positive effect. 
 
Scenario I: Simulating the impact on trade of a reduction in transportation costs 
 
The fact that the Belt and Road initiative is still in its early phases obliges us to use a simulation 
exercise to understand what its impact might be on international trade. As in any simulation exercise, 
there is uncertainty around the hypothesis behind the simulation. In our case, in particular, it is clearly 
difficult to estimate how much transportation costs will be reduced as a result of the improvement in 
infrastructure. 
 
There is obviously no comprehensive information that we can gather because the improvements in 
infrastructure – or construction of new infrastructure – do not yet exist or are still under construction. 
However, information on the few finalised projects can give a hint of the potential cost reduction in 
transportation. In the case of railway, the best example is the Yuxinou Railway (from Chongqing to 
Duisberg) because it is already functioning and data on the reduction in transportation time is 
available. More specifically, Chongqing’s mayor declared in 2015 that railway transportation costs on 
that route had been slashed by 50 percent. This is in line with the reduction in transportation time that 
has been achieved by introducing this new railway line: from 17-18 days to 12-13 days according to 
the Yuxinou official website and Chinese national official media8. In the case of maritime transportation, 
the cost savings stem from efficiency improvements in ports, many of which have not even been 
finalised. However, some examples of improvements in efficiency already exist, in particular for the 
Qingdao port. After some improvements in the functioning of the port, Qingdao customs reported that 
transportation costs out of and into the port would be reduce by about 5 percent9. Smaller reductions 
                                                          
8 PEOPLE.CN. This information can be found at http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2014/1029/c70731-25927853.html, 
http://www.yuxinoulogistics.com/detailed.asp?sid=229. 
9 There are no official statistics on how Belt and Road can facilitate maritime trade, but there is some evidence of improvements in clearance efficiency: 
http://qingdao.customs.gov.cn/publish/portal105/tab63061/info785626.htm, and http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2015-05/05/content_2856850.htm. 
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in maritime costs compared to railway costs seems logical if one considers that ports are already very 
efficient in a number of Asian countries, so only more limited gains might be possible even if the 
infrastructure improves. 
 
In this exercise, we take this information and apply the reduction of transportation costs across the 
board within the Belt and Road area. It should be noted that we do not include the cost of such 
improvements in transport infrastructure because of lack of data. More specifically, we reduce railway 
transportation costs by 50 percent and sea transportation costs by 5 percent, for the geographical 
area under the Belt and Road project. 
 
Panel A of Figure 5 reports the simulated top ten winners from the Belt and Road initiative, whose gains 
in trade range from 8 percent to 10 percent once transportation costs are reduced as previously stated. 
All of the top winners are located in Europe, with eight of them within the EU. Panel B of Figure 5 shows 
the top ten losers, all of which are outside Europe and Asia. This looks like a very logical finding 
because the rest of the world will not benefit as much from the improvement in infrastructure. In any 
event, trade losses are rather minimal so the impact is more about not gaining trade rather than losing 
trade. In fact, the negative impact on trade is less than 0.2 percent even for the biggest losers. Asian 
countries are not found to be among either the biggest winners or losers. This is probably explained by 
the fact that the estimated reduction in maritime transportation costs is quite moderate. 
 
Figure 5: Who wins and who loses in the transportation scenario 
 
Panel A: Top 10 winners in trade Panel B: Top 10 losers in trade  
  
                                       EU Countries                               Non-EU European Countries 
                                   Asian Countries                               The Rest of the World 
 
 
Source: Bruegel. 
 
Figure 6 shows the simulation results by region. The impact on trade by region is shown in panel A. The 
EU is the biggest winner from the Belt and Road initiative, with trade rising by more than 6 percent. 
Trade in the Asian region is also positively affected by the reduction in transportation costs, but only 
by half as much as the EU, with trade increasing by 3 percent. Conversely, the rest of the world suffers 
from a very slight reduction in trade (0.04 percent). The findings by region basically confirm our 
analysis at the country level. As a whole, our results point to the Silk Road being a win-win in terms of 
trade creation because the gains from EU and Asia clearly outweigh the loss felt by the rest of the world. 
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Figure 6: Regional trade impacts of the reduction in transportation costs 
 
                                                     EU Countries                                    Non-EU European Countries 
                    Asian Countries                              The Rest of the World 
 
Source: Bruegel. 
 
Scenario II: Simulating trade gains from establishing a free trade agreement within the Belt and 
Road area 
 
We now compare the previously estimated trade gains from Xi Jinping’s current vision of the Belt and 
Road initiative, which is centred on the reduction of transportation costs by upgrading infrastructure, to 
those stemming from dismantling trade tariffs thanks to a free trade agreement among Belt and Road 
countries and China. Like the previous analysis, because of the lack of data, we do not include the 
costs of negotiating and implement a free trade agreement. More specifically, we simulate the 
introduction of a free trade agreement within the Belt and Road area by cutting tariffs to zero and 
keeping transportation costs unchanged. 
 
Figure 7 shows the five biggest winners from the establishment of a free trade agreement within the 
Belt and Road area, and compares their trade gains with those obtained from reduced transportation 
costs. The biggest winners are Middle Eastern and central and east Asian countries, with trade 
increases of more than 15 percent. This compares favourably with the trade gains of 3 percent 
stemming from a reduction in transportation costs that were estimated for this group of economies. EU 
countries, whose trade gains were the largest under the reduced transportation cost scenario, would 
now experience weak losses. The result is intuitive, because the EU countries would be outside the 
Belt and Road free trade agreement, so EU trade would be expected to be substituted to some extent 
by enhanced trade within the Belt and Road region. This is true even for EU countries formally included 
in the Belt and Road initiative, such as Hungary and Poland. This is because EU members cannot strike 
separate trade agreements with China, so they could not take part in a potential Belt and Road free 
trade agreement (Table 1). 
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Figure 7: Comparison of transport cost reductions with a free trade agreement 
 
 
Source: Bruegel. 
 
Figure 8 further summarises the regional impact on trade of a Belt and Road free trade agreement. The 
EU, which was previously the biggest winner from the reduction in transportation costs, now suffers 
slightly from the Belt and Road free trade agreement. The Asian region becomes the biggest winner, 
followed by non-EU European countries, since they can also benefit from the elimination of trade tariffs. 
The impact of the regional free trade agreement on the rest of the world is positive, but much smaller 
than for the Asia and non-EU Europe regions. 
 
Figure 8: Impact of a free trade agreement on trade by region 
 
                                     EU Countries                              Non-EUU European Countries 
            Asian Countries                           The Rest of the World 
 
Source: Bruegel. 
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Table 1: Estimated trade gains for EU countries under scenarios I, II and III 
 
 
Scenario III: Simulating trade gains from both transportation improvement and free trade 
 
Lastly, we consider a combined package including both transportation improvement and 
establishment of a Belt and Road free trade agreement. In this scenario, the effect is the total of 
scenarios I and II. Figure 9 offers an overview of the simulation results for some major economies. 
 
Asian countries, such as Thailand and Vietnam, now become the biggest winners because they 
benefit from both the reduction in transportation costs and the elimination of trade tariffs. The EU 
also benefits quite significantly, but less than Asia. This is especially the case for some landlocked 
countries, such as Slovenia and Hungary, with trade gains of 8-9 percent, though these are still far 
below those experienced by Thailand and Vietnam. Among the developed countries, Germany also 
benefits slightly more than France, Spain and the UK (Table 1). This is actually very intuitive 
because the EU countries benefit from the transportation cost reduction but not the free trade 
arrangement. As the trade effect induced by transportation-cost reduction in the third scenario is 
smaller than that of the first tariff reduction scenario, it is in the EU countries’ interest to cooperate 
with China on transportation projects connecting the two areas. 
 
As is in the previous two scenarios, there are always some slight losses for countries far from the 
Belt and Road project, the biggest being Japan (-0.6 percent) while the impact on the US and Canada 
is very close to zero. 
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Figure 9: Simulation for the combined effect of transportation-cost reduction and establishment 
of the free trade agreement 
 
 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Our simulations show that EU countries would be clear winners in three different scenarios 
illustrating how Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road initiative could develop and impact EU and global trade. 
 
This is especially the case for Xi Jinping’s current vision for the Belt and Road, which is centred on 
the construction or improvement of transport infrastructure to reduce rail and maritime 
transportation costs. A free trade agreement between the Belt and Road countries and China would 
have a less positive impact. This is also true for eastern Europe and Central Asia and, to a lesser 
extent, south-east Asia. In contrast, if China were to embark on creation of a free trade area within 
the Belt and Road region, EU member states would no longer benefit, while Asia would. 
 
Our results, even if not fully comprehensive because of the lack of data, should be very encouraging 
for the EU. This would be even more the case if we could include the cost of improving such transport 
infrastructure, because the financing should mainly come from China – together with the countries 
within the Belt and Road, but not from the EU. 
 
In a nutshell, Xi Jinping’s current vision for the Belt and Road, centred on improving transport 
infrastructure, is very good news for Europe as far as trade creation is concerned. Confronted with 
such good news, it is quite striking that the discussion on the impact of the Belt and Road on Europe 
is still very embryonic. It goes without saying that more research is needed on the topic as trade is 
only one of the many ways through which the Belt and Road initiative might affect Europe. Financial 
channels, such as foreign direct investment and portfolio flows, are also very relevant and deserving 
of analysis. 
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Appendix 1: Data sources and statistics 
 
We use data from various sources. The bilateral data in 2014 was obtained from the UN Comtrade 
Dataset, which provides bilateral trade value for exports and imports denoted in the US dollars from 
every country pair. Because the differences in measures usually lead to similar gravity estimation 
results, we only use country exports to measure bilateral trade value. To analyse the extensive 
margin of trade, the missing country pairs are replaced by zero trade flows. 
 
To measure transportation costs we rely on the traditional index of ‘distance’. We calculate ocean, 
road, railway and air distances for the corresponding cost of each transportation mode between any 
two capitals as a proxy for countries. 
 
(1) Ocean distance is obtained from www.searates.com, which reports regular shipping distance 
between any two cities, including both the within-country transportation distance and across-
countries transportation distance. 
 
(2) To the best of our knowledge, railway distances are not readily available in any existing 
database. We first calculate the distances from Rome2Rio10. We insert the name of each capital (of 
the country) as the starting and destination in Rome2Rio respectively, then choose railway 
transportation, and finally obtain the distance of the railway route. Note that direct trains are not 
always available for country pairs, and some routes may require transfer via bus or metro, so we 
connect these countries if railway comprises a major way of transportation. Trans-continental routes 
from Asia to Europe, which are crucial to our analysis, are not available in Rome2Rio. To fill in the 
trans-continental routes we rely on United Nations (1999), which gives railway distances for 16 
major cities in Europe and Asia, and we connect these lines to the other city of Europe by adding 
distances of related cities from Rome2Rio. 
 
(3) Air distance is proxied by the geographic distance between the two countries. To that end, we 
calculate the population-weighted distance between large cities in the two countries. The source is 
CEPII. 
 
Merging these datasets finally leads to a sample of 16,748 bilateral trade observations covering 137 
countries. These countries are reported in table A1.1. 
 
Table A1.1: Countries covered in our sample 
European Union Belt and Road countries (excluding 
European Union) 
Rest of the world 
Austria, Belgium, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, 
France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, 
Albania, United Arab Emirates, 
Armenia,  Azerbaijan, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Belarus, Brunei 
Darussalam, Bhutan, China, Egypt, 
Georgia, Croatia, Hungary, 
Indonesia, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, 
Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Algeria, Argentina, Australia, 
Bahamas, Bangladesh, Belize, 
Botswana, Brazil, Burundi, 
Cameroon, Canada, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, 
Dominica, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, 
                                                          
10 Rome2Rio is a comprehensive multimodal transport search engine launched in April 2011: https://www.rome2rio.com. 
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Ireland, Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Malta, 
Netherlands, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Spain, Sweden and 
the United Kingdom. 
Cambodia, Kuwait, Lao, Lebanon, 
Liberia, Sri Lanka, Lithuania, Latvia, 
Moldova, Maldives, Macedonia, 
Myanmar, Malaysia, Nepal, Norway, 
Oman, Pakistan, Philippines, Qatar, 
Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore,  
Thailand, Philippines, 
Turkmenistan, Turkey, Ukraine, 
Uzbekistan. 
Ghana, Honduras, Iceland, Japan, 
Kenyan, Libya, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, 
Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Nicaragua, 
Niger, Nigeria, Panama, Paraguay, 
Peru, Republic of the Congo, 
Senegal , Seychelles, Sierra 
Leone, South Africa, Swaziland, 
Switzerland, Tanzania, Togo, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, 
Uganda, United States, Uruguay, 
Vanuatu, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
 
A number of other control variables from various sources are also included in this dataset. The GDP 
(expressed in dollars) for exporting and importing countries come from the World Bank WDI 
datasets. The product-level bilateral ad valorem tariff data is extracted from the TRAINS/WITS and the 
MACMap databases, developed jointly by ITC (UNCTAD-WTO, Geneva) and CEPII (Paris), and is 
aggregated to country-level weighted by the trade value from the last year. Other control variables, 
including contiguity, common currency, common legal origin, and colonial relationship, are obtained 
from the CEPII GRAVITY dataset. 
 
Table A1.2 reports the summary statistics of the trade and transportation variables. Our sample 
includes China’s exports to 129 countries, with the average bilateral export value reaching $13.30 
billion, far above the world average level. The Eurasian area as a whole plays an important role in 
world trade, with average bilateral trade for every country pair reaching $1.49 billion, twice as large 
as the world average level. However, despite the region’s significant contribution to international 
trade, transportation costs seem to hamper trade growth. For example, maritime transport was used 
for nearly 60 percent of China’s total exports in 2013, but the maritime distance to the other 
countries reaches 16,233.12 km for China, surpassing the world average level of 10,874.93 km. On 
the other hand, the railway distance for China is 9,138.74 km, much less than the maritime distance. 
Considering that railway speed is at least twice as fast as maritime speed, railway transportation 
could potentially have a great impact in terms of cutting transportation times for China. On the 
European side, though the maritime distance is more approachable than world average, it is still 
twice as the railway distance. Road and railway transport comprises the largest share within the EU 
region, but few road and rail networks stretch out to the Asian area. Approximately 57 percent of 
China’s trade with the EU was transacted via the maritime mode, while road and rail only comprises 
18 percent of transaction value. 
 
Table A1.2: Export value, maritime distance and railway distance 
 Variables All China’s 
exports 
EU’s exports B&R + EU 
Export 
value 
Country pair  
observations 
16748 129 3203 4983 
Average (billions) 0.77 13.30 1.49 1.32 
Maritime 
distance 
Country pair  
observations 16748 129 3203 4983 
Average (Km) 
10874.9
3 16233.12 9258.10 9098.57 
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Railway 
distance 
Country pair  
observations 1292 37 698 1200 
Average (Km) 5554.09 9138.72 4345.09 5570.15 
 
 
To supplement these results, we also obtain maritime time and fee statistics from two online 
sources: Sea Rates (www.searates.com) and World Freight Rates (www.worldfreightrates.com). 
Consistent with previous results, China’s average shipping time to its trading partners is about 610 
hours, much longer than the world average level, 406 hours. In particular, China’s average shipping 
time to European partners reaches 730 hours, which is around 20 percent more even than China’s 
average shipping time. This is embarrassing because the regions are geographically close. Although 
we do not have all official statistics reporting the railway time from China to Europe, a recent official 
report in China notes that the Yuxinou Railway which runs from Chongqing to Duisburg, Germany, 
only takes about 288 hours11. The evidence is clear that switching to railway transport has great 
potential for saving transport time. On the other hand, China’s average shipping cost with European 
countries is only $922 for a 40 foot container, about half as much as China’s average shipping cost. 
A report from DB Schenker (2012) shows that the price for railway transport is three times as much 
as for maritime transport. There is thus no doubt a trade-off between time and cost in terms of 
railway transportation. To foster international trade via railway, it is also imperative to slash railway 
transport costs through infrastructure construction. 
 
Table A1.3 reports the summary statistics for the other trade cost variables. China’s average bilateral 
ad valorem tariffs is around 5.7 percent, nearly the same as the world average level, but significantly 
higher than for the EU, which is nearly zero. For the other time-invariant trade cost variables, there is 
no country that shares the same currency or a colonial relationship with China. One of the apparent 
advantages for China is that it is a giant country with a number of geographically neighbouring 
countries. On the contrary, similar currency and legal systems are apparent advantages for 
European countries in international trade terms. 
 
Table A1.3: Summary statistics for the trade cost variables 
Variables World 
average 
China 
bilateral 
EU region 
Ad valorem tariff 0.057 0.058 0.004 
Contiguity 0.023 0.100 0.104 
Common currency 0.041 0.000 1.000 
Common legal system 0.301 0.223 0.237 
Colonial link 0.010 0.000 0.027 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
11 http://newscontent.cctv.com/NewJsp/news.jsp?fileId=328706. 
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Appendix 2: Comparison of maritime distance with railway distance for selected country pairs 
 
Origin Destination Maritime 
distance(km) 
Maritime 
time 
(estimated 
range) 
Railway 
distance(
km) 
Railway time 
(estimated 
range) 
China Azerbaijan 19303.22863 429 - 965 10060.8 101 - 335 
China Germany 21428.68397 476 - 1071 8990.264 90 - 300 
China Spain 18062.58842 401 - 903 12143.6 121 - 405 
China France 20877.96782 464 - 1044 10818.6 108 - 361 
China Russia 23284.73579 517 - 1164 7622 76 - 254 
Germany Belgium 1010.874734 22 - 51 772.4851 8 - 26 
Germany France 1203.931161 27 - 60 1084.215 11 - 36 
Germany Tajikistan 14158.57099 315 - 708 5524.714 55 - 184 
Germany Turkey 7010.317227 156 - 351 2632.2 26 - 88 
Spain Belgium 3629.254821 81 - 181 1991.8 20 - 66 
Spain France 3790.446315 84 - 190 1713.4 17 - 57 
Spain Italy 1574.465602 35 - 79 2268.4 23 - 76 
France Belgium 462.7335302 10 - 23 306.2 3 - 10 
France Italy 4455.538257 99 - 223 1432.3 14 - 48 
France Russia 3059.870329 68 - 153 3196.6 32 - 107 
France Tajikistan 13607.6939 302 - 680 9734.215 97 - 324 
Kazakhstan Germany 14119.96292 314 - 706 8765 88 - 292 
Kazakhstan Spain 10759.46788 239 - 538 11528.4 115 - 384 
Kazakhstan France 13569.10193 302 - 678 9849.215 98 - 328 
Uzbekistan Germany 12644.52001 281 - 632 6138.038 61 - 205 
Uzbekistan France 12093.64292 269 - 605 8484.215 85 - 283 
Vietnam Spain 15373.02723 342 - 769 14993.6 150 - 500 
Vietnam Germany 18738.83309 416 - 937 11840.26 118 - 395 
 
Note: Maritime and railway time are estimated based on our assumption of speed: Maritime: ‘20 
km/hr - 45 km/hr’; Railway : ‘30 km/hr - 100 km/hr’. 
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Appendix 3: Gravity model methodology 
 
The effect of the Belt and Road initiative is estimated using a conventional gravity model, which is 
standard in modern trade policy evaluation. The advantage of the model is that it provides an explicit 
form for various types of trade cost. It is thus easy to compare transportation cost and time with the 
other types of trade cost. Additionally, the model has a rigorous theoretical background and can 
analyse not only the bilateral effect of transportation time and cost change, but also their spillover 
effect on the other countries. The latter is usually termed as multilateral resistance (Anderson and 
Wincoop, 2003). 
 
To estimate the model we specify the trade between any two countries as a function of their log 
GDPs, tariffs, log transportation time and cost between them, and other control variables. 
 
ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( )i j i j i j i j i j i jT rade Y X Tariff TC controlsb b b b b b e+ = + + + + + +2 3 4 50 11 (A1) 
 
where tradeij is the bilateral trade between country i and j. We plus trade value with one before taking 
logarithm to avoid the zero trade problem. Yi is the GDP of the exporting county, Xi is the GDP of the 
importing country, Tariffsij, TCij, represents the tariffs and transportation cost between country i and j. 
To get a measure for trade cost we use distance as a proxy. The control variables include: contiguity, 
common currency, common language, and post-colonial relationship. We plus trade with one to deal 
with the zero trade flow problem. 
 
In this paper, we consider three types of transportation mode in international trade: ocean, airplane 
and railway. Although road is also a very important type of transportation mode, we do not include it 
in the paper for two reasons. First, pure road transport is only relevant for short-distance trade, and 
in most cases, road transport complements railway transport to facilitate international trade. 
Second, road driving distances between countries are very similar to railway distance, thus putting 
them together usually leads to serious multicollinearity problems. Thus, we write TCij in the following 
form, 
 
ln( ) ¡ l ln( ) ln( ) ln( )i j i j i j i jTC RailC AirC OceanCa a a= + +1 2 3 (A2) 
 
where α1, α2 , α3 represent the differential impact of each transportation mode on total 
transportation cost. Note that not all αs is necessarily strictly positive than zero. For countries with 
only one or two transportation mode applied, one or two αs can be set as zero. 
 
Incorporating the transportation cost term (2) into the main specification (1) yield our baseline 
specification: 
 
, ,
,
ln( ) ln( ) ln( )
ln( ) ln( )
ln( )
i j i j i j
i j i j
i j i j i j
T rade Y X Tariff
Rai lC AirC
OceanC controls
b b b b
b b
eb b
+ = + + +
+ +
+ + +
2 3
4 1 4 2
4 3 5
0 11
  (A3) 
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One of the key assumptions in equation (3) is that bilateral cost only affects bilateral trade between 
the two corresponding countries. However, as stated at the start of the section, recent gravity model 
theory has shown the importance of the multilateral resistance effect of trade costs, that is, a 
reduction in bilateral transportation cost can have spillover effects for a third country. For example, 
lower transportation costs between China and Europe might not only boost international trade in the 
Eurasian region, but also substitute Eurasia’s trade with the US. To capture the multilateral 
resistance effect, Anderson and Wincoop (2003) and Head and Mayer (2014) propose a more 
structural specification of the model. But the nonlinear calculation involved sometimes has difficulty 
in the convergence and sensitivity of the initial parameter choice. Baier and Bergstrand (2009) 
suggested a linear approximation (by means of a first order Taylor series expansion) of the 
multilateral resistance terms to avoid the non-linear procedure used in the traditional structural 
gravity model. Following this approach, we rewrite the trade cost term as: 
 
' ln ( ln ln ln )i j i j j i j i i j i j i j
j i i j
Z Z Z Z Zq q qq= - + -å å å å
 (A4) 
 
In theory θi and θj denotes the GDP share of country i and country j, but in the regression we follow 
Baier and Bergstand(2009)’s suggestion and define them as the average share to avoid 
endogeneity problem. Xij represents the trade cost variable, i.e. tariff and transportation costs. 
 
Now, we can extend equation (3) to the following baseline specification of the paper, 
 
, ,
,
ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) '
ln( ' ) ¡l ln( ' )
ln( ' )
i j i j i j
i j i j
i j i j i j
T rade Y X Tariff
Rai lC AirC
OceanC controls
b b b b
b b
b b e
+ = + + +
+ +
+ + +
0 1 2 3
4 1 4 2
4 3 5
1
  (A5) 
 
Where the variables with “’” are defined as in equation (4). Following Baier and Bergstrand (2009), 
we restrict the coefficients before direct and spill over effects to have identical but oppositely-
signed values. 
 
The main interest of the paper is ,
b4 1 to ,b4 3 , which denotes the net effect of transportation cost on 
international trade. To grasp the economic magnitude of the effects of transportation we also need to 
compare the two coefficients with b3 , interpreting them as the equivalent reductions in tariffs. The 
model is estimated using the (Pseudo) Poisson Maximum Likelihood estimator. Using the PPML 
method has particular advantage of dealing with the zero trade issues, and has been shown by Silva 
and Tenreyro (2006) as a robust estimator in the presence of heteroscedasticity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 4: Estimation results 
 
In this section, we report the detailed results for our estimation (Table A4.1). These results show that 
a reduction in transportation costs has a statistically significant and positive impact on international 
trade. First, in the case without considering the multilateral resistance term, we find that a 10 
percent reduction in railway, air and maritime costs, increases trade by 2 percent, 5 percent and 1 
percent respectively. As a second exercise, we take into account interrelationships between 
countries by estimating the multilateral resistance term previously described in equation (1). The 
results are similar both qualitatively and quantitatively (in column 3 and 4, with and without control 
variables respectively)12. All in all, a one percentage reduction in airline cost has the greatest impact 
on international trade. A one percentage reduction in railway cost has less than half that impact and 
a similar reduction in maritime one less than one fourth. 
 
As regards the rest of the variables in Equation 1, the coefficient for the GDP is estimated to be 
between 0.7 and 0.9, a bit smaller but still close to the theoretical prediction of one. In the same line, 
consistent with the existing literature, contiguity, common currency and common legal origins have 
a very large and positive effect on international trade. However, we do not find a statistically 
significant relationship between post-colonial linkages and international trade. 
 
Table A4.1:  Regression results 
Method (1) PPML_Bilateral (2) PPML_Bilateral (3) PPML_Multilateral (4) PPML_Multilateral 
VARIABLES Export   Export          Export              Export  
Bilateral tariff -0.098** -0.032** -0.132** -0.103**  
 (4.52) (3.94) (4.50) (8.26)  
Ln Railway -0.157** -0.197** -0.221** -0.203**  
 (6.11) (7.47) (2.74) (8.51)  
Ln Airplane -0.820** -0.482** -0.790** -0.548**  
 (7.50) (5.27) (5.47) (5.62)  
Ln Maritime -0.314** -0.122* -0.327** -0.112**  
 (4.74) (2.08) (4.51) (2.87)  
Contiguity  -0.016  0.029  
  (0.10)  (0.22)  
Common currency  1.992**  1.993**  
  (6.71)  (16.61)  
Common legal origin  1.040**  0.824**  
  (8.90)  (9.75)  
Colonial link  -0.303  -0.114  
  (1.79)  (0.68)  
GDP_i 0.936** 0.799** 0.807** 0.775**  
 (30.47) (26.91) (15.77) (50.07)  
GDP_n 0.864** 0.740** 0.813** 0.727**  
 (30.46) (24.38) (17.45) (35.13)  
                                                          
12 This finding is consistent with Head and Mayer (2014) whose simulations indicate that the Modular Trade Impact including the multilateral resistance is 
close to the Partial Trade Impact excluding the multilateral resistance term. 
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Constant -5.905** -7.839** 4.395** -7.689**  
 (7.75) (12.79) (4.73) (4.84)  
R2 0.89 0.97 0.89 0.96  
Observations       12,819        12,819        12,819        12,819  
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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